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Science, precautionary principle and the law in two recent 
judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union on 
glyphosate and hunting management• 
by Sara De Vido  
Abstract: Scienza, principio di precauzione e diritto in due recenti sentenze della Corte 
di giustizia dell’Unione europea su glifosato e caccia di gestione – This article is aimed 
at assessing the interplay that exists, from a legal point of view, between the precautionary 
principle and science in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union with regard to 
two judgments concerning the use of glyphosate (Blaise and others) and the protection of 
animals under the 1992 Habitats Directive (Tapiola), both decided in October 2019. I will 
argue that the precautionary principle is more a political rather than a scientific principle that 
informs the activity of public authorities and that the CJEU – mutatis mutandis, potentially all 
courts – could examine its application through the lens of the reasonableness of the measures 
adopted by competent authorities. 
Keywords: Precautionary principle, glyphosate, hunting management, science in 
international courts, biodiversity, protection of non-human animals, reasonableness. 
For I wish to argue that the law - our profession, our art,  
our discipline, call it what you will - has grown out of touch  
with the scientific outlook that dominates our age, and that it must 
change its attitude so as to harmonise with that outlook if it wants to 
remain a living and respected force  
in contemporary society. 
(P. Brett, The Implications of Science for the Law, in Mc Gill Law Journal, 18, 
1972, 170) 
1. Introduction and scope of the analysis 
This article is aimed at assessing the interplay that exists, from a legal point of 
view, between the precautionary principle and science in front of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) with regard to two recent judgments 
concerning the use of glyphosate and the protection of animals under the 1992 
Habitats Directive. I will argue that the precautionary principle is more a political 
rather than a scientific principle that informs the activity of public authorities and 
 
• This essay is part of the project “Environmental Sustainability in Europe: A Socio-Legal 
Perspective”, co-funded by the European Union through the Actions Jean Monnet Modules 
(coordinated by prof. Serena Baldin of the University of Trieste, Italy). 
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that the CJEU – mutatis mutandis, potentially all courts – could examine its 
application through the lens of the reasonableness of the measures adopted by 
competent authorities. The two cases under analysis, both adopted in October 
2019, are particularly significant. The first one, Blaise and Others, on glyphosate, 
did not assess the validity of the decision that authorised the use of the substance 
in the EU, but rather of the general regulation which established the procedure to 
ban or authorise a certain substance1. To a certain extent, the judgment was 
‘limited’ because it confirmed the validity of the general regulation but not of the 
specific measure on glyphosate, which was not put into question. In the second 
case, Tapiola, on the hunting management of wolves in Finland, the Court 
examined whether the Habitats Directive allowed this kind of measure to be 
adopted by a national authority with the declared purpose to fight against 
poaching2. In both cases, the Court applied the precautionary principle – in the 
Tapiola case, for the first time with regard to non-human animals – and used 
science to confirm a European Union act or to challenge a specific national 
decision. The article starts with some considerations on the definition of science 
and of precautionary principle. It then briefly explores how courts have used 
science in domestic and international proceedings, and it then analyses the 
approach of the CJEU, focusing on the judgments under analysis. It will then 
discuss how difficult it is for a court like the CJEU to apply science and the 
precautionary principle, without considering every situation of uncertainty as 
potential ground for the application of precaution, and how the use of the principle 
of reasonableness could be useful to measure its appropriate application.  
2. Definitions: science and precaution 
For the purpose of this article, science is meant as a ‘process for proposing and 
refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further 
testing and refinement’3. When science so defined (necessarily) enters the law,4 as 
 
1 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 October 2019, Criminal proceedings against 
Mathieu Blaise and others, Case C-616/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:800.  
2 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 10 October 2019, Luonnonsuojeluyhdistys Tapiola 
Pohjois-Savo — Kainuu ry, Case C-674/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:851.  
3 This definition was included in an amicus curiae brief submitted by the National Academy of 
Sciences and the American Association for the Advancement of Science to the Supreme Court 
in the Daubert case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
4 We will not discuss here whether or not law itself can be considered as science. See, in the 
sense that law is science, the famous work by N. Bobbio, Scienza del diritto e analisi del 
linguaggio, re-published in U. Scarpelli (ed.), Diritto e analisi del linguaggio, Milano, 1976, 287 
ss. Bobbio clearly argued that ‘il giurista, quando svolge la sua ricerca, fa della scienza nel 
senso proprio della parola’ (ivi, 324), and referred to neo-positivism to stress that the truth 
must be considered in terms of accuracy, something that jurisprudence can achieve (ivi, 300). 
The debate has been intense in the US, where Langdell first introduced the concept of law as 
science at Harvard Law School in the late nineteenth century. In 1923, however, another 
American scholar pointed out that ‘the law is not scientific’ (W.G. Morse, The Law as a Science, 
in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, 10, 3, 1923, 59 ss., 62. 
59-68). Almost ninety years after this affirmation, Nancy Cook made the argument that law 
is science if we consider the latter ‘not as the discovery of fixed principles, but as rhetorical 
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it was argued by Stephen Breyer in the Reference Manual for Scientific Evidence, first 
published in 1994 by the US Federal Judicial Center, ‘the upshot is that we must 
search for law that reflects an understanding of the relevant underlying science,’ 
which does not mean a research for ‘scientific precision,’ but rather that ‘the law 
must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically sound 
knowledge’5. Every scholar is perfectly aware of the challenges posed by the 
notion of science itself, and it is not the purpose of this article to enter an endless 
debate on the matter. Relying on science must avoid two major risks: on one hand, 
the risk of introducing in the proceedings the so-called ‘junk science,’ which alters 
the reconstruction of the facts and manipulates evidentiary outcomes6; on the 
other hand, the risk of excluding new developments of science owing to the 
stringent rules of procedures applicable in court. The philosopher of science Karl 
Popper identified the requirements of the scientific status of a theory: its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability. He wrote the following: 
I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being 
singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its 
logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical 
tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system 
to be refuted by experience7. 
The International Court of Justice came close to a definition of science in the 
Whaling Case, Australia v. Japan8, decided in 2014, which concerned the whaling 
programme Jarpa II launched by Japan for the declared purpose of scientific 
research. In the judgment, the Court argued that science is objective: ‘whether the 
killing, taking and treating of whales pursuant to a requested special permit is for 
purposes of scientific research … cannot simply depend upon the State’s 
perception’9. Despite not proposing any complete definition, the Court affirmed 
that ‘the process of science is interwoven in the standard of review for comparing 
the objectives, design, and implementation of Jarpa II’10.  
The other concept which is relevant for the analysis is the one of ‘precaution.’ 
Commentators have extensively discussed the nature of the precaution as a 
principle, - and, if so, whether aspirational or binding rule, - or approach, or 
strategy11. Some authors are convinced that precaution has ripened into a norm of 
 
invention and/or creative reconceptualization’ (N. Cook, Law as Science: Revisiting Langdell’s 
Paradigm in the 21st Century, in North Dakota Law Review, 88, 2012, 22 ss., 38).  
5 S. Breyer, Introduction, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, Washington D.C., 3. ed., 
2011, 4.  
6 Cfr. M. Mocchegiani, Sapere scientifico e ruolo del giudice. Primi appunti, in Quaderni 
costituzionali, 3, 2017, 571 ss., in part. 573.  
7 K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, New York, 1959, 18.  
8 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2014, 226.  
9 Whaling in the Antarctic, para. 61.  
10 M. Mangel, Whales, science, and scientific whaling in the International Court of Justice, in PNAS, 
113/51, 2016, 14524. 
11 On the precautionary principle, see, inter alia, among hundreds of studies, J.E. Hickey Jr, 
V.R. Walker, Refining the precautionary principle in international environmental law, in Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal, 14(3), 1995, 423 ss.; D. Freestone, E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary 
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customary international law12. Others, however, prefer to use the concept as 
principle: ‘[i]f the precautionary principle is viewed not as a customary law rule 
but simply as a general principle then its use by national and international courts 
and by international organisations is easier to explain’13. Precaution must be 
surely appreciated as ‘one of the central concepts for organizing, influencing and 
explaining contemporary international environmental law and policy’14.  
As it is well-known, the principle was created in national law: the German 
Vorsorgeprinzip dates back to 1972 when it was incorporated in the 
Immissionsschutzgesetz (Federal Emission Control Act). At the international level, 
 
Principle and International Law: The challenge of implementation, The Hague, London, Boston, 
1996;  J. Cameron, The precautionary principle: Core meaning, constitutional framework and 
procedures for implementation, in R. Harding and E. Fisher (eds.), Perspectives on the Precautionary 
Principle, Leichhardt, New South Wales, 1999, 29 ss.; T. O’Riordan, J. Cameron and A. Jordan 
(eds.), Re-Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, London, 2001; J. Cameron and J. Abouchar, 
The precautionary principle: A fundamental principle of law and policy for the protection of the global 
environment, in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 14, 1991, 1 ss.; D. 
Freestone and E. Hey (eds.), The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The challenge of 
implementation, The Hague; London; Boston, 1996; E. Fisher, Is the precautionary principle 
justiciable?, in Journal of Environmental Law, 2001, 13 (3), 315 ss.; P. Harremoes, D. Gee, M. 
MacGarvinet al. (eds.), The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century: Late lessons from early 
warnings, London, Sterling, 2002; A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary 
Principle in International Law, The Hague, London, Boston, 2002; L. Boisson de Chazournes, 
Le principe de précaution: nature, contenu et limites, in C. Leben, J. Verhoeven, Le principe de 
précaution. Aspects de droit international et communautaire, Paris, 2002, 65 ss.;  G.E. Marchant, 
K.L. Mossman, Arbitrary and capricious: the precautionary principle in the European Union courts, 
Washington, 2004; L. Marini, Il principio di precauzione nel diritto internazionale e comunitario, 
Padova, 2004; E. Fisher, J. Jones and R. von Schomberg (eds.), Implementing the 
Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and prospects, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, 
2006; F. Bassan, Gli obblighi di precauzione nel diritto internazionale, Napoli, 2006;  L. 
Butti, Principio di precauzione, Codice dell’Ambiente e giurisprudenza delle Corti comunitarie e della 
Corte costituzionale, in Riv. giur. ambiente, 2006, 6, 809 ss.; A. Bianchi, M. Gestri (eds), Il principio 
di precauzione nel diritto internazionale e comunitario, Milano, 2006; J.B. Wiener, Precaution, in 
D. Bodansky, Brunnée, E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, 
Oxford, 2007, 597 ss.; A. Stirling, Risk, precaution and science: towards a more constructive policy 
debate, EMBO reports, 2007, 8(4), 309 ss.; A. Fodella, L. Pineschi, La protezione dell’ambiente nel 
diritto internazionale, Torino, 2009; J. Zander, The application of the precautionary principle in 
practice: comparative dimensions, Cambridge, 2010; C.E. Foster, Science and the Precautionary 
Principle in International Courts and Tribunals, Cambridge, 2011; D. Vogel, The Politics of 
Precaution: Regulating Health, safety, and environmental risks in Europe and the United States, 
Princeton, 2015; A. Proelss, Principles of EU Environmental Law: An Appraisal, in Y. Nakanishi 
(ed.), Contemporary Issues in environmental law. The EU and Japan, Tokyo, 2016, 29 ss.; R. 
Rayfuse, Precaution and Climate Change: What Role for the Precautionary Principle in Addressing 
Global Warming, in A. Proelss (ed.), Protecting the Environment for Future Generations, Berlin, 
2017, 61 ss.  
12 A Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary, cit., 284. 
13 A. Boyle, The Environmental Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
in The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2007, 22(3), 375. Referring to a “still 
evolving principle of environmental protection”, J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law, Cambridge, 2012, 357. 
14 P. Birne, A. Boyle, C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, Oxford, 2009, 147. 
See also D. Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, Cambridge, MA, 
2010, 200: “[principles] articulate collective aspirations that play an important role over the 
longer term, framing both discussions about the development of international law and 
negotiations to develop more precise norms.” 
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the precautionary principle was first endorsed in the 1982 UN Charter for Nature, 
and later codified in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration15: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation16. 
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in 1992, 
encapsulates the precautionary principle, without directly naming it, in its 
preamble: ‘Noting also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss 
of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.’ Article 3(3) of the 
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change required States, 
among the principles, to ‘take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.’  
Similarly, in 2000, States parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
agreed on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; according to its provisions, States 
can refuse imports of modified organisms where scientific certainty is lacking, in 
order to avoid or minimise their adverse effects. The precautionary principle was 
invoked before the International Court of Justice by Hungary in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros case17, but not further discussed in the merits by judges. As far as the 
law of the sea is concerned, first the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), in its judgment on Southern Bluefin Tuna, posited that the parties should 
act ‘with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are 
taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of Southern Bluefin tuna’18, and some 
years later, in its Advisory Opinion, the Seabed Chamber of the same tribunal was 
more explicit in affirming that the precautionary approach was an obligation of 
States sponsoring activities in the Area19. 
At the regional, European, level, the precautionary principle was first added 
in Art. 130 r, para. 2, of the EC Treaty with the Treaty of Maastricht, then defined 
by the CJEU as a ‘fundamental principle of environmental law’20, and eventually 
clearly enshrined in Art. 191 (2) TFEU:  
 
15 O. McIntyre, T. Mosedale, The Precautionary principle as a norm of customary international law, 
in Journal of Environmental Law, 1997, 9, 221 ss.; A. Fodella, I principi generali, in Fodella, 
Pineschi (eds), op. cit., 106-107.  
16 Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 
1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 12 August 1992. 
17 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1997, 7, para. 
97.  
18 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, New Zealand and Australia v. Japan, ITLOS, order of 27 August 
1999 (provisional measures), para. 77. See also Judge Treves, concurring opinion, para. 8: ‘the 
Tribunal must assess the urgency of the prescription of its measures in light of prudence and 
caution. This approach, which may be called precautionary, is hinted at in the order […] it 
would seem to me that the requirement of urgency is satisfied only in the light of such 
precautionary approach’.  
19 ITLOS, Advisory opinion, paras. 125-135. 
20 ECJ, Commission v. France, C-121/07, judgment of 9 December 2008, 2008 I-09159.  
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Community policy on the environment shall aim at high level of protection 
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the 
Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle […].  
Despite being only mentioned as an environmental law principle, the 
precautionary principle has a wider scope, as acknowledged by the European 
Commission in its 2000 Communication on the precautionary principle: 
The precautionary principle is not defined in the Treaty, which prescribes it 
only once – to protect the environment. But in practice its scope is much 
wider, and specifically where preliminary objective scientific evaluation, 
indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially 
dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be 
inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen for the Community21. 
Precaution is defined as a ‘risk management strategy’ applicable when ‘there 
are reasonable grounds for concern that potential hazards may affect the 
environment or human, animal or plant health, and when at the same time the 
available data preclude a detailed risk evaluation’22. The two interrelated aspects 
of the precautionary principle as identified by the Commission are the following: 
a. ‘the political decision to act or not to act as such, which is linked to the factors 
triggering recourse to the precautionary principle;’ and b. in the affirmative, how 
to act, i.e. the measures resulting from application of the precautionary principle23. 
Following the definition of the Commission, the precautionary principle is 
relevant when there is a potential risk which cannot be fully demonstrated or 
quantified or whose effects cannot be determined. The application of the 
precautionary principle depends on the ‘identification of potentially negative 
effects’ and on the scientific evaluation of the potential adverse effects24. The 
European Environment Agency provided a working definition of precaution in its 
Late Lessons from Early Warnings II - Science, Precaution and Innovation:  
The precautionary principle provides justification for public policy and other 
actions in situations of scientific complexity, uncertainty and ignorance, 
where there may be a need to act in order to avoid, or reduce, potentially 
serious or irreversible threats to health and/or the environment, using an 
appropriate strength of scientific evidence, and taking into account the pros 
and cons of action and inaction and their distribution25. 
3. The relevance of science in court: a concise overview 
The world is rapidly changing. So is law. The use of forensic science and DNA 
evidence have become very common in criminal proceedings, and new 
developments in genetics, neuroscience and material sciences ‘are entering the 
 
21 Communication from the European Commission on the precautionary principle 
(COM(2000) 1 final of 2 February 2000).  
22 Communication of the Commission, 8.  
23 Communication of the Commission, 12.  
24 Communication of the Commission, 13.  
25 Late lessons from early warnings II: science, precaution and innovation (EEA Report, 1/2013).  
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legal discourse’26. The purpose of this article is not to delve into the way domestic 
courts use science in criminal or civil proceedings brought before them27. A 
premise, however, which also touches upon the application of science in domestic 
proceedings, seems fundamental. Science, it was argued, ‘cannot speak for itself to 
a legal factfinder,’ and when it is presented in court, judges must be persuaded that 
‘science’s findings relate truthfully and reliably to the events, actions, intentions 
and consequences that are the subject matter of adjudication’28. Expert witness 
might play a fundamental role in a proceeding, because they offer specialised 
testimony to facilitate a court’s determination of scientific or technical facts. What 
happens when science evolves, when new findings might change – say – the level 
of risk attached to a certain product or procedure?29 What if a substance that had 
been considered safe turns out to be potentially dangerous for human health? And, 
most importantly, how can judges grasp this change? 
In order to understand whether scientific evidence is reliable, courts have 
elaborated criteria which might be source of inspiration for the work of 
international and regional courts. Hence, for example, in the US, departing from 
a previous jurisprudence based on the ‘general acceptance theory’30, courts 
contended, in the ground-breaking Daubert case decided by the US Supreme Court 
in 199331, that it should be assessed whether the claim has been tested, whether it 
was peer-reviewed, whether an error rate has been determined and whether the 
underlying science has won general acceptance32.  
Environmental cases also need science. As Dinah Shelton acknowledged:  
Scientific evidence is necessary to evaluate risks to the environment or 
natural resources. It is also important to cases alleging injury from pollution, 
and when environmental regulations are challenged as either a 
disproportionate infringement of rights or, in the international arena, as a 
disguised restriction on trade. Environmental science helps determine the 
causal links between the activities and the impacts, giving courts a set of data 
on which to base decisions about whether or not a proper balance of interests 
 
26 S. Seidman Diamond and R.O. Lempert, When Law Calls, Does Science Answer? A Survey of 
Distinguished Scientists & Engineers, in Dœdalus, The Journal of the American Academy of Art & 
Science, 2018, 42.  
27 On expert evidence in court, see, extensively, D. Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of Expert 
Evidence, Cambridge, 2008. With regard to the use of science in front of the Italian 
Constitutional Court, M. Cartabia, Qualche riflessione di un giudice costituzionale intorno al 
problema dell’intreccio tra diritto, scienza e tecnologia, in Biolaw Journal, 2017, 9 ss. Comparing 
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights, see 
G. Ragone, Valutazioni e fatti scientifici tra ragionevolezza e proporzionalità: brevi note sul 
ragionamento giuridico della Corte costituzionale e della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo, in M. 
D’Amico, F. Biondi (eds), La Corte costituzionale e i fatti: istruttoria ed effetti delle decisioni, Napoli, 
2018, 285 ss.  
28 S. Jasanoff, Science, Common Sense & Judicial Power in US Courts, in Dœdalus, The Journal of 
the American Academy of Art & Science, 2018, 16.  
29 M. Tallachini, EpiChange: Scienza e diritto in tribunale, in Epidemiol Prev 2014, 38 (3-4), 159 
ss.  
30 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (DC Cir. 1923).  
31 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579 (1993).  
32 Jasanoff, op. cit., 17. On science in US courts, see the Supreme Court’s Daubert trilogy 
analysed in C. Cranor, Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the Possibility of Justice, Cambridge, 2006, 
in particular the chapter on science and law in conflict. 
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has been made. The substance of environmental rights involves evaluating 
ecological systems, determining the impacts that can be tolerated and what 
is needed to maintain and protect the natural base on which life depends. 
Environmental quality standards, precaution, and principles of sustainability 
can establish the limits of environmental decision making and continue to 
give specific content to environmental rights in law33. 
At the international level, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. 
Slovakia)34 and in the Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)35 cases, scientific experts36 
acted as counsel, and were not subject to cross-examination by the Court in the 
Hague. In the first case, the parties included ‘an impressive amount of scientific 
material’ to support their arguments, to which the International Court of Justice 
gave ‘most careful attention’ to conclude that ‘it is not necessary in order to 
respond to the questions put to it in the Special Agreement for it to determine 
which of those points of view is scientifically better founded’37. In his separate 
opinion, Judge Weeramantry stressed the shortcomings of a pure inter partes 
adversarial procedures, when it comes to cases of environmental danger, and 
emphasised the importance of science, by arguing that environmental law is a ‘vital 
branch of law,’ which needs ‘all the insights available from the human experience, 
crossing cultural and disciplinary boundaries which have traditionally hemmed in 
the discipline of international law’38. In Pulp Mills, the International Court of 
Justice dedicated a part of its legal reasoning to the issue of expert evidence, given 
the fact that both parties, Argentina and Uruguay, presented factual and scientific 
material in support of their respective claims39. The Court also observed that the 
experts could have been presented by the parties as expert witnesses under 
Articles 57 and 64 of the Rules of Court, instead of being appointed as mere counsels 
 
33 D. Shelton, Complexities and Uncertainties in Matters of Human Rights and the Environment: 
Identifying the Judicial Role, in J.H. Knox, R. Pejan (eds), The Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment, Cambridge, 2018, 106.  
34 The case originated from a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia on the construction 
programme on the Danube aimed at producing hydroelectricity, pursuant to an agreement of 
1977. Hungary contended that there were ecological risks in continuing the project and 
suspended the implementation. For my purposes, it is relevant to note that the Court did not 
rely on the precautionary principle – which was invoked by Hungary – to support its argument 
on ecological necessity. On the case, see, extensively, S. Forlati, M. Moïse Mbengue, B. 
McGarry (eds), The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Judgment and Its Contribution to the Development of 
International Law, Leiden, Boston, 2020. 
35 Argentina argued that Uruguay violated the Statute of the River Uruguay signed in 1975 
by authorising, constructing and commissioning two pulp mills which the applicant 
considered as having detrimental effects on the quality of the waters of the rivers. See, inter 
alia, C. R. Payne, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay: The International Court of Justice Recognizes 
Environmental Impact Assessment as a Duty Under International Law, in ASIL Insights, 14, 2010; 
P. Merkouris, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay): Of 
Environmental Impact Assessments and ‘Phantom Experts’, in The Hague Justice Portal, 2010; D. 
Carreau, F. Marrella, Droit international, Paris, 2018, 386.  
36 Four scientists were appointed as advocates by Hungary, two scientists as ‘counsels and 
experts’ by Slovakia. In the Pulp Mills, both parties appointed six delegation members as 
‘scientific advisors and experts’.  
37 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, para. 54.  
38 Separate opinion Judge Weeramantry, 118-119.  
39 Pulp Mills, para. 165.  
 The role of science in environmental  
and climate change adjudications 
 
 
DPCE online, 2020/2 – Saggi  
ISSN: 2037-6677 
1327 
in the delegations. The defence counsels of both parties included the experts as 
counsel in their respective delegations40. The International Court of Justice 
contended that ‘those persons who provide evidence before the Court based on 
their scientific or technical knowledge and on their personal experience should 
testify before the Court as experts, witnesses or in some cases in both capacities, 
rather than counsel, so that they may be submitted to questioning by the other 
party as well as by the Court.’ As for the independence of the experts summoned 
in court and the use of scientific evidence, the Court explained that: 
It [did] not find it necessary in order to adjudicate the present case to enter 
into a general discussion on the relative merits, reliability and authority of 
the documents and studies prepared by the experts and consultants of the 
Parties. It needs only to be mindful of the fact that, despite the volume and 
complexity of the factual information submitted to it, it is the responsibility 
of the Court, after having given careful consideration to all the evidence 
placed before it by the Parties, to determine which facts must be considered 
relevant, to assess their probative value, and to draw conclusions from them 
as appropriate. Thus, in keeping with its practice, the Court will make its 
own determination of the facts, on the basis of the evidence presented to it, 
and then it will apply the relevant rules of international law to those facts 
which it has found to have existed41. 
Hence, the Court confirmed to have the competence to appreciate the value 
of the facts as presented by the parties, without entering any general discussion 
on the reliability of scientific resources. Two judges, Al-Khasawneh and Simma, 
did not agree with this affirmation, and contended in their joint dissenting opinion 
that: 
the exceptionally fact-intensive case before us is unlike most cases submitted 
to the Court and raises serious questions as to the role that scientific evidence 
can play in an international judicial institution. The traditional methods of 
evaluating evidence are deficient in assessing the relevance of such complex, 
technical and scientific facts42. 
They considered the Court ‘not in a position adequately to assess and weigh 
complex scientific evidence of the type presented by the Parties,’ and objected the 
‘method’ that was used by the majority of judges43. According to the dissenting 
judges, the Court could have asked the parties to produce evidence or explanations 
or triggered Article 50 of its Statute, requesting outside sources of expertise in 
handling complex scientific or technical disputes44.  
In the Whaling in the Antarctic case (Australia v. Japan)45, the first case in which 
scientific experts were cross-examined, the Court demonstrated, as Philippe Sands 
 
40 Ivi, para. 167.  
41 Pulp Mills, para. 168.  
42 Dissenting opinion of Judges Khasawneh and Simma, para. 3.  
43 Ivi, para. 5.  
44 Ivi, para. 7-8.  
45 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2014, 226. The question that was asked to the Court was whether Japan violated the 
International Whaling Convention of 1946 by pursuing the Jarpa II plan, which authorised 
whaling for purpose of scientific research. The Convention, which is aimed at regulating, not 
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argued, to have ‘a potentially significant role to play in assisting in the resolution 
of legal disputes that involve competing contentions as to matters of facts, 
including scientific facts’46. The International Court of Justice relied on the 
experts, but ‘did not give carte blanche acceptance of expert opinion’ and provided 
‘a number of general lessons about science and law’47. 
Science is required to analyse the effects of human activities on the 
environment and to prevent – through measures of preventive or precautionary 
nature – the commission of long-lasting and irreversible harm. Data science is also 
relevant to provide new insight into existing theories and to offer judges and 
scholars ‘a different lens of analysis’48. Even though law itself might be considered 
as science49, it is not thus straightforward that every judge possesses the extra-
legal knowledge that is necessary to read data or to appreciate the reliability of 
one scientist instead of the other. Courts that do not specialise in environmental 
law, for example, ‘have struggled to apply novel legal concepts embedded in 
bespoke environmental law regimes, such as environmental impact assessment,’ 
and owing to issues related to scientific knowledge, ‘establishing the facts on 
traditional rules of evidence […] has been difficult’50. It is even more difficult 
when it comes to apply precaution and other environmental principles, whose 
content and legal nature are particularly difficult to grasp51. Caroline Foster 
contended in her book on science and the precautionary principle that where there 
is scientific uncertainty, ‘mixed questions of fact and law’ emerge; they include 
‘tests governing how states should act in situations of incomplete scientific 
knowledge, for example by requiring them to act only in ways that are reasonable, 
necessary or proportionate, or to co-operate appropriately with one another’52.  
4. The relevance of science and the precautionary principle in the Court of 
Justice of the European Union jurisprudence 
The Courts in Luxembourg have applied the precautionary principle in 
preliminary rulings on the interpretation and the validity of EU law. Owing to the 
characteristics of the adjudicatory procedure, the application of the precautionary 
principle has been based on scientific findings conducted by other institutions, 
usually the Council and the European Commission. As it was argued by Caroline 
Foster, ‘generally, scientific disputes within the European Union are much less 
 
prohibiting, whaling, allows States to invoke exceptions for purposes of scientific research. 
The International Court of Justice concluded that the issuance of whaling permits involving 
the use of lethal methods ‘did not comply with the scientific research requirement.’ 
46 P. Sands, Climate Change and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the Future in International Law, in 
Journal of Environmental Law, 2016, 28, 30.  
47 M. Mangel, Whales, science, and scientific whaling in the International Court of Justice, in 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2016, 113(51), 14526.  
48 D. Charlotin, Identifying the Voices of Unseen Actors in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in F. 
Baetens (ed.), Legitimacy of Unseen Actors in International Adjudication, Cambridge, 2019, 392.  
49 See, above, note 4. 
50 E. Fisher, B. Lange, E. Scotford, Environmental Law, Oxford, 2019, 2.ed, 185.  
51 Shelton, op. cit., 98.  
52 Foster, Science and the precautionary principle, cit.,138.  
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likely to give rise to mixed questions of fact and law than in international law,’ 
because the European Union institutions have the competence to adopt preventive 
or precautionary measures as political decisions, without waiting ‘for the reality 
and seriousness of risks to become apparent’53. The CJEU and the General Court 
(previously, Court of first instance) might be – and they were – asked to pronounce 
on scientific matters, to interpret European norms adopted by the Parliament and 
the Council and to decide on the validity of a European Union act. By doing so, 
Courts are required to apply environmental principles, even without having a 
specific expertise in that respect. The precautionary principle is binding for EU 
institutions; it can be either permissive or obligatory in nature54. Two authors, 
Garnett and Parsons, investigated how the precautionary principle has been 
applied in practice by the European Union in a selection of cases and pieces of 
legislation55. Their assessment was based on three attributes, namely the severity 
of potential harm, the degree of epistemic uncertainty, and the precautionary 
measures taken56. In a continuum between weak and strong precaution, the 
authors argued that weak precaution means that ‘uncertainty does not justify 
inaction’ and therefore that regulation is permitted (though banning is very rare); 
moderate precaution is described as ‘uncertainty [which] justifies action,’ where 
there are potentially dangerous effects, and regulatory standards are envisaged, 
included banning as last resort; strong precaution entails the shifting of the burden 
of proof to the proponent of an activity, who must demonstrate it is safe, and 
banning57. In terms of the relevance of science for the characterisation of the risk, 
the CJEU decided, in a case concerning preservatives and salt in food, that ‘the 
risk must be measured, not according to the yardstick of general conjecture, but 
on the basis of relevant scientific research’58. The threshold of the risk – or, better, 
the uncertainty of the risk59 – is interpreted by the CJEU and depends on the 
legislation invoked in the proceedings60. Another author concluded that European 
Courts are more comfortable with some criteria – for example that precautionary 
actions should be proportionate – than others – such as that precautionary actions 
 
53 Foster, Science and the precautionary principle, cit., 24. See also Judgment of the Court of 5 
May 1998, UK v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1998:192, para. 99: ‘where there is uncertainty as to 
the existence or extent of risks to human health, the institutions may take protective measures 
without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent.’ 
54 J. Scott, The Precautionary Principle before EU Courts, in R. Macrory (ed.), Principles of 
European Environmental Law, Groningen, 2004, 54 ss.; M. Haritz, An Inconvenient Deliberation: 
The Precautionary Principle's Contribution to the Uncertainties Surrounding Climate Change 
Litigation, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011, 95.  
55 K. Garnett, D.J. Parsons, Multi-Case Review of the Application of the Precautionary Principle in 
European Union Law and Case Law, in Risk Analysis, 37(3), 2017, 502.  
56 Ivi, 505. Four judgments that were analysed by the two scholars were assessed to be weak 
applications, whereas another one weak-to-moderate (the one on bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy BSE with a strong risk for public health). 
57 Ivi, 506.  
58 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 14 July 1994, Criminal proceedings against J.J.J. 
Van der Veldt, Case C-17/93, para. 17. 
59 M.B.A. van Asselt, E. Vos, The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox, in Journal 
of Risk Research, 9, 2006, 313 ss.  
60 J. Scott, Legal Aspects of the Precautionary Principle, in The British Academy Briefing, 2018, 10.  
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must be subject to review in light of scientific data61. They are, in other words, 
more ‘comfortable’ with well-established principles than with the evolution of 
science which might be difficult to be fully appreciated from a legal point of view. 
The complexity of the challenge faced by courts dealing with environmental and 
food safety matters is well represented in the Pfizer Animal Health SA case, 
concerning the transfer of resistance to antibiotics from animals to humans62. 
Science played a key role in the decision of the Court of First Instance, which 
acknowledged how ‘the possibility and the probability of such transfer and the risk 
which it may entail for public health continue to give rise to argument in scientific 
circles’63, and observed that all the bodies that dealt with the issues confirmed the 
need for further research on the matter. The contested EU provision withdrew the 
authorisation of virginiamycin as an additive in feeding stuffs, a decision to which 
Pfizer Animal Health objected. The Court applied the precautionary principle in 
one of its first pioneering judgments. It argued that ‘where there is scientific 
uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the Community 
institutions may, by reason of the precautionary principle, take protective 
measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks 
become fully apparent’64. The Court explained that it cannot take ‘a purely 
hypothetical approach to risk,’ but that, since the Treaty requires to ensure the 
‘high level of human health protection,’ this level  ‘does not necessarily have to be 
the highest that is technically possible’65. It was argued that, ‘as this reference to 
hypothetical risks suggests, the Court of Justice of the EU places science at the 
heart of its interpretation of the precautionary principle’66. The legality of the EU’s 
prohibition of antibiotics was confirmed by the Court, despite disagreement on the 
existence of the risk. The Court contended that ‘the level of risk deemed 
unacceptable will depend on the assessment made by the competent public authority 
of the particular circumstances of each individual case’67. Concerning the burden 
of proof, the Court contended that Pfizer was ‘wrong to criticise the Community 
institutions for failing, in the risk assessment carried out during the procedure 
culminating in adoption of the contested regulation, to produce proof of the reality 
or the seriousness of the risks to human health associated with the use of 
virginiamycin as a growth promoter’68, and that the Community institutions only 
needed to show that the contested regulation was adopted ‘following as thorough 
 
61 M.D. Rogers, Risk Management and the Record of the Precautionary Principle in EU Case Law, 
in Journal of Risk Research, 2011, 14(4), 467 ss. See also R. Lofstedt, The Precautionary Principle 
in the European Union: Why a Formal Review is Long Overdue, in Risk Management, 2014, 16(3), 
137 ss.  
62 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber), 11 September 2002, Pfizer Animal 
Health v. Council of the European Union, Case T-13/99. ECLI:EU:T:2002:209.  
63 Pfizer Animal Health, para. 36. Emphasis added. A comment on the judgment in A. 
Alemanno, Protection des consommateurs: Arrêts Alpharma/Pfizer, in Revue de l’Union européenne, 
4/02, 842 ss., and van Asselt and Vos, op. cit.  
64 Pfizer Animal Health, para. 139. 
65 Ivi, para. 152. 
66 Scott, Legal Aspects, 11.  
67 Pfizer Animal Health, para. 153. See also Scott, Legal Aspects, cit., 10. 
68 Ivi, para. 164.  
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a scientific risk assessment as possible, which took account of the particular 
circumstances of the present case’69. In particular, under the precautionary 
principle, the Community institutions are entitled, in the interests of human 
health, to adopt, on the basis of an incomplete scientific knowledge, protective 
measures which may seriously harm legally protected positions, and they enjoy a 
broad discretion in that regard70. To support its argument, however, the Court 
only relied on the opinion by the Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition 
(‘SCAN’) appointed by the Commission and composed of experts, which concluded 
that the use of virginiamycin did not constitute an immediate risk to public health 
in Denmark, though using ‘the language of uncertainty’ throughout the text. In 
other words, SCAN ‘implicitly argued that there is an uncertain risk, but it does 
not constitute an immediate hazard, because any hazard that may be associated 
with virginiamycin is under control’71. Relying on the uncertainty expressed by 
SCAN, the European institutions prohibited the antibiotics and the Court 
confirmed their decision, dismissing the applicant’s complaint. Pfizer Animal 
Health SA specified a procedure for evaluating scientific evidence in law making 
and defined the evidentiary threshold of ‘hypothetical risk’ applicable to 
precaution, which was summarised as follows: 
1. The Court acknowledged the validity of measures based on the precautionary 
approach as a response to scientific uncertainty relating to human health; 
2. The preventative measures while ‘not fully demonstrated by conclusive 
science’ must be adequately supported by available scientific data; 
3. The risk, based not on mere hypothesis nor requiring scientific confirmation, 
must be assessed by the public authority based on the specific circumstances 
and taking into account the possible adverse impacts, available remedies and 
available scientific data; 
4. The Court reaffirmed the importance of deference to the public authority, in 
the sense when scientific uncertainty or inability to conduct a risk 
assessment persists, this situation does not prevent the public authority to 
take preventive measures72.  
In the Pfizer case, the cost and benefit analysis, which should characterise 
the precautionary measure, was raised but then it was simply downgraded to some 
general considerations on proportionality73. Even though the Court contended 
that it could only provide a limited review, because the final decision was up to the 
domestic institutions, ‘[it] could not avoid discussing scientific validity and the 
merits of the scientific arguments raised by both parties,’ in particular the link 
between the use of virginiamycin as an additive in feeding-stuffs and the 
 
69 Ivi, para. 165.  
70 Ivi, para. 170.  
71 van Asselt and Vos, op. cit., 321.  
72 M.-C. Cordonier Segger, H.E. Judge C.G. Weeramantry, Sustainable development principles in 
the decisions of international courts and tribunals 1992-2012, London, 611.  
73 Rogers, op. cit., 478.  
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development of streptogramin resistance in humans74. The two authors 
demonstrated what they called ‘the uncertainty paradox:’ while on one hand great 
uncertainty is emphasised, on the other hand, it is suggested that sufficiently 
reliable and cogent scientific evidence and a proper scientific basis were available 
to support the uncertainty75. The Court judged the reliability of scientific evidence, 
putting itself in a position of ‘super-expert’.  
This behaviour of the Court echoes the words written by the International 
Court of Justice Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma, who warned against the 
insufficient adjudicatory methods for evaluating evidence, especially when a case 
is fact-intensive76. Hence, stuck in a deadlock, the Court of First Instance 
constructed the scientific uncertainty which paved the way for the application of 
the precautionary principle77. Since in all cases of uncertainty scientific opinions 
might differ, this would mean that the precautionary principle has the potential to 
be always applied, and hence practically being deprived of meaning. I agree with 
the argument made by the two aforementioned authors, who acknowledged the 
importance of the precautionary principle, but at the same time considered that it 
was necessary to rethink the role of scientific advice in decision-making about 
uncertain risks78. Another author, commenting the Pfizer case, pointed out that 
‘from invocations of the precautionary principle in practice, it is clear that non-
scientific decision-making plays an essential role in finding a triggering risk’79. I 
will now turn to the two cases on glyphosate and the hunting management of 
wolves to see whether, and if so, how, there has been an evolution in the recent 
jurisprudence of the CJEU concerning the application of the precautionary 
principle.  
4.1. Science, precaution, and glyphosate 
Glyphosate is an active substance used in pesticides to control plants, which means 
it is a herbicide, used in agriculture, horticulture and in some non-cultivated areas 
as well80. It has been used for decades and its effects have been assessed by Member 
States, the European Chemicals Agency, and the European Food Safety Authority. 
Though its use is authorised in the European Union at least until the next renewal 
scheduled in 2022, through an Implementing Regulation of the Commission81, the 
substance has raised much controversy and debate. In Italy, for example, a decision 
 
74 van Asselt and Vos, op. cit., 325. 
75 Ivi, 326.  
76 See above, para. 3.  
77 Ivi, 329.  
78 Ibid.  
79 V.R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a ‘Neutral Arbiter’ for Triggering Precautions, in Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review, 2003, 26, 225.  
80 https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/glyphosate_en 
81 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2324 of 12 December 2017 renewing the 
approval of the active substance glyphosate in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 
1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant 
protection products on the market and amending the Annex to Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 540/2011. C/2017/8419, OJ L 333, 15.12.2017, 10-16.  
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was taken at regional level; the Consorzio del prosecco Docg Conegliano-Valdobbiadene 
has banned the glyphosate since 1. January 201982. Luxembourg banned the use 
of this active substance in January 2020. The decision was announced by the 
Minister of Agriculture and will lead to the prohibition of any glyphosate’s 
containing products as of 1. January 202183.  
European Courts rendered two judgments on glyphosate in 2019. In Antony 
C. Tweedale v. European Food Safety Authority84, the General Court annulled the 
decision of the European Food Safety Authority denying the applicant access to 
two studies on the toxicity of glyphosate. In the second one, decided on 1. October 
2019, Blaise and others, which is particularly relevant for the analysis in these 
pages, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU assessed the validity of Regulation No. 
1107/2009 on the placing of plant protection products85, including glyphosate, 
also in light of the precautionary principle, but could not have a final word on the 
2017 decision of the Commission to authorise glyphosate in Europe. The contested 
regulation provides the legal framework for the authorisation of plant protection 
products in commercial form and for their placing on the market, use and control. 
The Regulation is based on the precautionary principle as it is stated in Article 1, 
which is worth reproducing in extenso: 
The provisions of this Regulation are underpinned by the precautionary 
principle in order to ensure that active substances or products placed on the 
market do not adversely affect human or animal health or the environment. 
In particular, Member States shall not be prevented from applying the 
precautionary principle where there is scientific uncertainty as to the risks 
with regard to human or animal health or the environment posed by the plant 
protection products to be authorised in their territory86.  
In the preamble, the reversal of the burden of proof is formulated as follows:  
The precautionary principle should be applied and this Regulation should 
ensure that industry demonstrates that substances or products produced or 
placed on the market do not have any harmful effect on human or animal 
health or any unacceptable effects on the environment (recital No. 8). 
The case originated from a criminal proceeding started in France against 
Mr Blaise and 20 people who entered shops in Ariège and damaged cans of weed 
killer, containing glyphosate. The accused argued that their action was based on 
the principles of necessity and precaution and aimed to inform shops of the dangers 
 
82 The decision was however put into question after the publication of the report by the US 
environmental protection agency, which affirmed that it ‘continues to find that there are no 
risks of concern to human health when glyphosate is used in accordance with its current label. 
EPA also found that glyphosate is unlikely to be a human carcinogen.’ 
https://www.epa.gov/ingredients-used-pesticide-products/glyphosate 
83 https://blogdroiteuropeen.com/2020/02/04/luxembourg-to-become-the-1st-eu-country-
to-ban-glyphosates-products-a-commentary-by-alessandra-donati/ 
84 Judgment of the GC of 7 March 2019, Antony C. Tweedale v. European Food Safety Authority, 
T-716/14, EU:T:2019:141 
85 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and 
repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC, OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, 1–50.  
86 Emphasis added.  
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associated with the substances. The referring court considered it necessary to 
understand whether the Regulation was valid in light of the precautionary 
principle. The Court first defined the precautionary principle, relying on previous 
jurisprudence, as follows: ‘where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent 
of risks to human health, protective measures may be taken without having to wait 
until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent’87. It also 
added the following, not thus crystal-clear, formula: ‘Where it proves to be 
impossible to determine with certainty the existence or extent of the alleged risk 
because the results of studies conducted are inconclusive, but the likelihood of real 
harm to public health persists should the risk materialise, the precautionary 
principle justifies the adoption of restrictive measures.’ In other words, the 
uncertainty of the risk, which is proved by the current level of science, combined 
with the (non-hypothetical) real harm in case the risk materialises leads to 
restrictions on the basis of the precautionary principle. The judges then contended 
that, based on the Regulation under assessment, it is first necessary to identify the 
‘potentially negative consequences for health of the use of the active substances 
and plant protection products,’ then to conduct a ‘comprehensive assessment of 
the risk to health based on the most reliable scientific data available and the most 
recent results of international research’88. Even though the CJEU tried to avoid 
any scientific evaluation, referring to the fact that it is for the local authorities to 
decide, it inevitably decided on scientific matters. For example, being absent a 
definition of active substance in the Regulation, the Court concluded that active 
substances could be defined on the basis of Article 2(2) of the Regulation, as 
‘having general or specific action against harmful organisms or on plants, parts of 
plants or plant products are to be regarded as active substances,’ and that the 
application for the authorisation must be accompanied by a complete and a 
summary dossier for each substance89. With regard to the cumulative effects of 
substances, the Court considered as crystal-clear that an assessment of the 
cumulative effects had to be conducted relying on both the Regulation and on the 
Commission Regulation of 1 March 2013 setting out the data requirements for 
plant protection products. From the systemic interpretation of different legal 
instruments, the Court concluded that ‘the authorisation of a plant protection 
product must necessarily include an assessment not only of the specific effects of 
the active substances contained in that product, but also of the cumulative effects 
of those substances and their effects combined with other constituents of that 
product’90. Even stressing how it is up to the local authorities to decide in the 
matters, it is evident that the Court, by interpreting the legislation, told the 
referring judge how ‘scientific’ an analysis should be. Hence, for example, the 
Court acknowledged that ‘the Member State to which an application is submitted 
must undertake an independent, objective and transparent assessment of that 
 
87 Blaise, para. 43.  
88 Blaise, para. 46.  
89 Blaise, paras. 54-55.  
90 Ivi, para. 75.  
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application in the light of current scientific and technical knowledge, while the 
Authority must adopt a decision in the light of current scientific and technical 
knowledge’91. What if the current knowledge is divided, though? In light of the 
precautionary principle, the authorities must take into account relevant evidence 
other than the tests, analyses and studies submitted by the applicant, in particular 
‘the most reliable scientific data available and the most recent results of 
international research and not to give in all cases preponderant weight to the 
studies provided by the applicant’92. The burden of proof lies on the applicant to 
demonstrate that a product has no immediate or delayed harmful effect on health, 
but then the competent authorities must, in accordance with the precautionary 
principle, take into account other studies and researches, and if the applicant is not 
able to ensure the authorities that the requirements for the approval are satisfied, 
then the application must be rejected93. According to the test on weak-moderate 
or strong precaution94, this is a case of moderate-to-strong precaution, because 
uncertainty entails regulation and a potential ban.  
The referring court also asked the Court to assess the compatibility of the 
Regulation with the precautionary principle where it exempted the applicant from 
carrying out tests of long-term carcinogenicity and toxicity. The Court disagreed 
with the referring court, since the applicant had to show the absence of immediate 
or delayed harmful effects on human health, and therefore the authorities, when 
examining the application, had to be sure that the analysis conducted by the 
applicant excluded the risk of carcinogenicity and toxicity95. The validity of the 
regulation was upheld. This does not mean that glyphosate was authorised by the 
Court, but that the Regulation at the basis of the mechanism of authorisation 
respects EU law and the precautionary principle. If asked to analyse the 
Commission Implementing Regulation No. 2017/2324 of 12 December 2017, the 
Court might have probably reached the same conclusion as in the Pfizer case. 
Subject to the uncertainty of the risk, which is demonstrated in the case of 
glyphosate by the available contradictory scientific knowledge, the precautionary 
principle as legal principle would have suggested to the Court that the 
authorisation had not to be granted.  
4.2. Science, precaution and non-human animals 
Few days later than the judgment on glyphosate, the CJEU decided on whether 
legal killing for management purposes was allowed under European Union law, 
in particular under the 1992 Habitats Directive96, with the declared purpose to 
prevent illegal killings. The judgment in the Tapiola case says much more than 
the obvious – that the Habitats Directive does not grant an absolute protection 
 
91 Ivi, para. 88.  
92 Ivi, para. 94.  
93 Ivi, para. 95.  
94 See above, note 55. 
95 Ivi, para. 116.  
96 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and 
of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, 7–50.  
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without derogation to species and habitats97 – and provides a restrictive 
interpretation of the derogations included in the Habitats Directive, in light of the 
precautionary principle. The case originated from the action brought in front of 
the Finnish courts by Tapiola, a Finnish association for nature conservation, 
against the Finnish Wildlife Agency which authorised the killing of a total of 
seven wolves in the region of Pohjois-Savo (Finland) during the period between 
23 January and 21 February 2016. The Agency argued that the management 
measure was necessary to prevent poaching and that it was taken in consideration 
of the harm wolves had caused to other animals over the years and the concern 
expressed by local population. The Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme 
Administrative Court of Finland) referred the case to CJEU, asking for the 
interpretation of Article 16 (1) of the Habitats Directive, which reads: 
Provided that there is no satisfactory alternative and the derogation is not 
detrimental to the maintenance of the populations of the species concerned 
at a favourable conservation status in their natural range, Member States 
may derogate from the provisions of Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 (a) and (b): 
[…] e). to allow, under strictly supervised conditions, on a selective basis 
and to a limited extent, the taking or keeping of certain specimens of the 
species listed in Annex IV in limited numbers specified by the competent 
national authorities. 
The wolf is one of the species of Community interest, subject to different 
regulations depending on the location. Annex IV of the Directive lists the species 
that must be strictly protected, and Annex V grants a more flexible regime. Annex 
V included the Finnish wolf in the reindeer management area at the time of the 
national decision on the hunting management98. When wolves are subject to the 
regime under Annex IV of the Directive, the exception to the prohibition of killing 
under Article 12 is through derogations under Article 16(1)(e). The CJEU 
interpreted the derogation in a very restrictive way, eventually relying on the 
precautionary principle. The Court first noted that a derogation decision must 
define the objectives of that derogation ‘in a clear and precise manner and with 
supporting evidence’99. It acknowledged that combating poaching is a means of 
contributing to the maintenance of restoration of the species and an object covered 
by Article 16 of the Habitats Directive100. The Court, as in previous judgments, 
contended that it is up to the national authority to support ‘on the basis of rigorous 
scientific data, including, where appropriate, comparative data on the effects of 
hunting for population management purposes on the conservation status of 
wolves,’ that hunting for population management purposes ‘is actually capable of 
reducing illegal hunting to such an extent that it would have a net positive effect 
 
97 See S. De Vido, Protecting Biodiversity in Europe: The Habitats and Birds Directives and Their 
Application in Italy in an Evolving Perspective, in Y. Nakanishi (ed.), Contemporary Issues in 
Environmental Law - The EU and Japan, Tokyo, 2016, 115 ss. 
98 At the time of writing, all wolves in Finland are included in Annex IV, since Annex V 
encompasses the Spanish wolves North of the Duera and Greek populations North of the 39th 
parallel only. 
99 Tapiola, para. 41.  
100 Ivi, para. 43.  
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on the conservation status of the wolf population, whilst taking account of the 
number of derogation permits envisaged and the most recent estimates of the 
number of wolves taken illegally’101. The first element of the analysis is hence to 
demonstrate that the measure is actually aimed at the conservation of the species. 
The referring Finnish Court objected that there was not any scientific evidence 
concerning the legal hunting of protected species as a way to reduce poaching and 
to promote the conservation of wolves. Tapiola and the Agency had opposite views 
on the matter. The second element of the analysis was the absence of alternatives. 
In that respect, the Court first argued that the existence of an illegal activity 
cannot ‘exempt a Member State from its obligation to ensure the safeguarding of 
species protected’102. The competent national authorities – said the Court – when 
authorising derogation must establish, ‘taking account in particular of the best 
relevant scientific and technical evidence and in the light of the circumstances of 
the specific situation in question, that there is no satisfactory alternative that can 
achieve the objective pursued, in compliance with the prohibitions laid down in 
the Habitats Directive’103. The existence of an illegal activity cannot alone be 
sufficient to support a decision in that respect. Even though the Court referred the 
case to the domestic court (to confirm or not the conclusion of the European 
Court), it went thus far as to say that ‘there is nothing in the order for reference 
to indicate that the Agency has demonstrated that the only way of achieving the 
objective relied upon in support of the derogation permits for population 
management purposes was to authorise … a certain level of wolf hunting for 
population management purposes’104, and that the Agency could not demonstrate 
the absence of satisfactory alternatives. Furthermore, the measure must ensure 
not to be detrimental to the conservation status of the population105. In 
considering the number of wolves killed in 2015-2016 for management purposes 
– the data being provided by Tapiola and the European Commission – the Court 
considered that it was not thus clear whether the management plan and the 
national law were in conformity with the requirements identified by its own 
judgment, and that it was up to the referring court to decide106. The precautionary 
principle is applied in this pivotal paragraph107: 
In that context, it must also be noted that, in accordance with the 
precautionary principle enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU, if, after examining 
the best scientific data available, there remains uncertainty as to whether or not a 
derogation will be detrimental to the maintenance or restoration of 
populations of an endangered species at a favourable conservation status, the 
Member State must refrain from granting or implementing that derogation. 
 
101 Ivi, para. 45.  
102 Ivi, para. 48.  
103 Ivi, para. 51.  
104 Ivi, para. 52.  
105  The Court then referred, following the legal reasoning of the Advocate General, to the 
level of conservation of the species in the biogeographical region (para. 58 ss.).  
106 Tapiola, para. 65. 
107 Ivi, para. 66.  
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In other words, it is important to have the certainty of the uncertainty of the 
outcome of a certain measure or contradictory positions on the same outcome to 
apply the precautionary principle. The burden of proof is on the competent 
authority – the Finnish Agency – to establish, on the basis of scientific data, that 
the territorial and quantitative limits are sufficient to ensure that the derogations 
‘will not be detrimental to the maintenance of the population of the concerned 
species at a favourable conservation status in its natural range’108. The Court, in a 
very short passage, argued that ‘derogations by way of exception must be assessed 
also in the light of the precautionary principle’109. It seems to imply that when the 
authority is not capable, using the best scientific data available, of demonstrating 
that the measure will not be detrimental to the population, the measure must be 
avoided. The number of species to be kept or taken must also depend on scientific 
data provided by the authority, and must be ‘the narrowest, most specific and 
efficient way possible’110. The derogation decided by the national agency did not 
seem to oblige hunters to target specific specimens. Data showed that 20 alpha 
males were killed in the previous hunting year, raising doubts on the efficiency of 
the management. This is a case of strong precaution under the Garnett and 
Parsons scheme. 
4.3. Same principle, different application 
Though concerning both environmental issues, the two judgments differ on one 
hand for the fact that the regulation on substances already encapsulated the 
precautionary principle, which is not the case for the Habitats Directive, and, on 
the other hand, in the object of the protection: on one hand (Blaise and others) 
human health, on the other (Tapiola) the conservation of wolves. The strict 
standards of interpretation are usually applied to protect human health, as defined 
in the founding treaties (Article 191(1) TFEU). For the first time, the Court went 
beyond a strict anthropocentric view – consciously or not – by recognising the 
relevance of conservation measures for the non-human animals and not for 
humans, applying the precautionary principle in light of the scope of the Habitats 
directive, which is to protect the natural heritage of the Union.  
In terms of the application of the precautionary principle, it is interesting to 
note that, compared to the glyphosate, the Court in the Tapiola case went a step 
further: in interpreting the Habitats Directive, it did not only set the requirements 
for a measure to be in conformity with the Directive, but also cast doubts on the 
compatibility of the national measure. As it was argued, ‘tolerance hunting of 
wolves could in principle be based on Article 16(1)(a), although the evidence 
proving such hunting to be firmly in the wolf’s own interest would need to be at 
 
108 Ivi, para. 67.  
109 Ivi, para. 69. See also the similar conclusions reached by Advocate General 
Saugmandsgaard Øe, Opinion of 8 May 2019, para. 92.  
110 Ivi, para. 73.  
 The role of science in environmental  
and climate change adjudications 
 
 
DPCE online, 2020/2 – Saggi  
ISSN: 2037-6677 
1339 
least as strong’111. Science only can justify future legitimate hunting, the 
precautionary principle ‘prevent[ing] Member States from making exceptions to 
strict protection if the best available science leaves uncertainty as to whether the 
conservation status of population involved would be negatively affected’112. 
Science was fundamental in both cases for the application of the precautionary 
principle. As for the glyphosate case, the Court delved into how scientific an 
analysis had to be, in light of the ‘most reliable’ and ‘most recent’ scientific 
research, excluding that the authorities can rely on the assessment presented by 
the applicant only. The precautionary principle, applied in its moderate to strong 
case, is described as the impossibility to determine, using the most recent and 
reliable scientific data, the alleged risks but, in order not to be a mere hypothesis, 
the likelihood of real harm must persist. In the Tapiola case, the reference is to the 
‘most rigorous data’ in a comparative perspective, and the precautionary principle 
is described as the uncertainty that remains as to whether or not the measure (in 
this case hunting management) is detrimental to the conservation of species. The 
burden of proof lies on the applicant (for the substance) and on the authority that 
decides the measure on hunting management. 
5. The precautionary principle as a political tool to be examined through the 
lens of reasonableness 
I am suggesting here that authorities could use the precautionary principle as a 
political tool in front of the uncertainties of science113, and that its application 
should be assessed by courts in light of the principle of reasonableness. As Scott 
pointed out, ‘there is a rich body of literature in the environmental social sciences 
and science and technology studies that cautions that precautionary decision-
making is inherently political and that it is misleading to suggest that it can be 
exclusively ‘science-based’114. Another author talked about the ‘myth’ of neutrality 
of science for triggering precaution, and that non-scientific decisions are necessary 
when ‘lawmakers define the factual predicate for taking precautions’115. The 
element of ‘harm’, according to this author, is also subject to non-scientific 
decisions; he argued that ‘a definition of the kind and degree of ‘harm’ that should 
 
111 A. Trouwborst, F.M. Fleurke, Killing Wolves Legally: Exploring the Scope for Lethal Wolf 
Management under European Nature Conservation Law, in Journal of International Wildlife Law 
& Policy, 22(3), 2019, 269. See also, Y. Epstein, G. Chapron, The Hunting of Strictly Protected 
Species: The Tapiola Case and the Limits of Derogation under Article 16 of the Habitats Directive, 
in European Energy and Environmental Law Review, 2018, 27(3), 78 ss.  
112 Y. Eppstein and others, EU Court: Science must justify future hunting, in Science, 2019, 
366(6468), 2019, 961.  
113 The Advocate General Sharpston, in her opinion, confirmed to a certain extent the fact 
that the precautionary principle is a political tool, because she contended that once a) assessed 
the potentially negative consequences for health and the environment of the proposed 
substance, and b) conducted the comprehensive risk assessment of the risk to health, then the 
authorities can apply the precautionary principle. See her opinion to the Blaise and others case, 
of 12 March 2019, para. 48.  
114 Scott, Legal Aspects, 11.  
115 Walker, op. cit., 198.  
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trigger precautionary measures is necessarily a balance of risks and benefits under 
the circumstances, which is beyond the domain of pure science116. The boundaries 
between precaution and prevention are also blurred. If science can determine the 
severity of the potential harm and the likelihood that the risk materialises, then 
the measures that will be applied fall under the category of prevention rather than 
of precaution117. Given the uncertainties that stem from the application of the 
precautionary principle, the suggestion here is to use this principle as a parameter 
of reasonableness, which is not unknown to the CJEU118. Reasonableness refers to 
the fact that ‘in given contexts and matters the law has to refrain from governing 
human behaviour with specific and detailed rules of conduct;’ it is a ‘general 
standard guiding the ascertainment and evaluation of the particular situation’119. 
The principle responds to the quests for adaptability and flexibility. To be 
reasonable, a person should rely on the conclusions of science, when they are well-
established and do not present any controversy. Rawls pointed out that science 
‘can provide for all the widely recognised elements of objectivity to a greater 
extent than any other human enterprise’120. However, as a philosopher of law 
contended, reasonableness can lead to a ‘unenlightened conformism deferential to 
the judgments of the authority’, as Rawls and others might suggest, or to an open-
minded view which defends ‘the most outlandish speculations […] supporting 
them with the most diverse and the most exquisite arguments that ‘a reason slave 
of the passion’ can suggest’121. Despite the argument on the most outlandish 
speculations seems to me controversial, because it can lead to the denial of well-
established scientific theories, even to the point of jeopardising human health, if 
applied to the uncertainty of the application of the precautionary principle, it 
particularly works. In the case of glyphosate, as anticipated, there are opposite 
views: on one hand, authorities and national agencies are contending that there 
seem to be no negative effects for human health, and, on the other hand, serious 
doubts are raised by other researchers supported by civil society on the risk of 
potential harm. Where is the truth? Here we cannot enter the philosophical debate 
on truth, which is far beyond my knowledge, but this debate happens in front of a 
court, which is asked whether a measure can or cannot be adopted on the basis of 
the precautionary principle. How risky should be the risk to trigger the principle? 
And how solid must be science to shift the balance from a yes to a no?  
Given these considerations, I consider reasonableness to be useful to solve 
the impasse. Far from being a secondary principle – Corten argued – the principle 
provides flexibility for rules, fills the lacunae in existing law ‘bringing about 
systematisation and legitimacy for the international legal order, and providing 
 
116 Walker, op. cit., 200. 
117 Bassan, op. cit., 75.  
118 See, in that respect, A. Adinolfi, The Principle of Reasonableness in European Union Law, in 
G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor, C. Valentini (eds), Reasonableness and Law, Dordrecht, 
Heidelberg, London, New York, 2009, 383 ss. 
119 S. Bertea, Certainty, Reasonableness and Argumentation in law, in Argumentation, 18, 2004, 467- 
468.  
120 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia, Columbia University Press, 1996, 110.  
121 A. Artosi, Reasonableness, Common Sense and Science, in Bongiovanni et al., op. cit., 77.  
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room for different interpretations’122. The objection could be that in this way the 
vagueness of the precautionary principle is solved using another vague principle. 
Nonetheless, Corten clearly highlighted how the notion of reasonable 
‘demonstrates the contradiction between, on one hand, the static nature of a legal 
system and the need to integrate facts […] within the system’123. Corten 
suggested that the verification that a specific measure is reasonable depends on 
three stages (from a substantive point of view)124. First, a legitimate purpose or 
objective, which is discretionary. In the cases under analysis, the legitimate 
purposes were to protect human health and the conservation of species (in the 
Tapiola case this purpose was supposed to be reached through the fight against 
poaching). Secondly, the casual link between the measure and the legitimate 
purpose. Is this not precisely what the CJEU assessed in the Tapiola case? 
Whether hunting management could reduce illegal poaching? Thirdly, the 
proportionality of the measure. Again, in the Tapiola, was it not the assessment of 
whether the measure of hunting management was efficient to reach the declared 
scope and whether alternatives were considered and later excluded? To the 
substantive element of the concept should be added the formal element – the 
existence of a justificatory discourse – which must be exempted from 
contradictions and be based on an understandable and logical reasoning125. Here 
precaution has a role to play; it justifies and explains the adoption of certain 
measures in an understandable and logical way. The formal aspect is rational, 
relative and temporary, it can change over time according to the evolution of 
science126.  
As they are described, the substantive and the formal elements of 
reasonableness identified by Corten suggest that it is a matter of procedure more 
than of evaluation of science. This finds confirmation in the thought of the two 
authors that identified a paradox in the application of the precautionary principle 
and contended that two actions are required: the first one is ‘the epistemological 
acceptance that in case of uncertain risk, guarantees are not to be found in scientific 
truth and certainty,’ and the second one is ‘the insight that the interpretation and 
application of the precautionary principle should be considered in a procedural 
sense’127. It means that, owing to the acknowledgement of the uncertainty of 
science, authorities will interpret the ‘uncertainty information’ in a discretionary 
way, explaining the reasons why the principle is invoked. As a consequence, ‘an 
aggrieved party could still challenge Commission/Council decisions, but not any 
longer in a way that would force the Court to review scientific claims. The 
aggrieved party may bring forward that the normative preferences are 
 
122 Corten, Reasonableness in International Law, in R. Wolfrum, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford, 2013, 645 ss.  
123 O. Corten, The Notion of ‘Reasonable’ in International Law: Legal Discourse, Reason and 
Contradictions, in International Comparative Law Quarterly, 48(3), 1999, 617.  
124 Corten, The Notion, cit., 623.  
125 Corten, The Notion, cit., 621-622.  
126 Corten, The Notion, cit., 623.  
127 van Asselt and Vos, op. cit., 332. The two authors applied the ‘test’ to the Pfizer case.  
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debatable’128. ‘Debatable’ precisely entails a reasonableness analysis with the 
assessment of the alternatives and the respect of the principle of proportionality. 
In this way, more than objective as used by the International Court of Justice129, 
reasonableness is subjective, because it is based on a decision of the authorities 
authorising or not a substance relying on the precautionary principle, whose 
application will be assessed following the scheme: justificatory discourse (formal), 
legitimate purpose, causal link and proportionality (substantive). Science matters 
when the applicant (the company asking for the authorisation or the agency 
willing to support a measure jeopardising the conservation of a species) presents 
its application. It is not far from what the CJEU already does. The CJEU used 
some elements of reasonableness in the two judgments under analysis, especially 
the Tapiola case, which shows an evolution in the legal reasoning of the court. The 
glyphosate case resembles the Pfizer case in the sense that the uncertainties of 
science led to the application of the precautionary principle, without questioning 
the causal link of the measures though reflecting on proportionality (it could have 
been a costs-benefits analysis). It confirmed the substantive element of the 
legitimacy of the objective – human health – but the legal reasoning seemed to be 
stuck in the search for the certainty of the uncertainties of the risk. In the Tapiola 
case, as I anticipated, the Court applied de facto a reasonable test, using science and 
the precautionary principle to raise serious doubts on the legitimacy and the 
proportionality of the measure adopted by the Finnish agency which authorised 
the hunting management.  
6. Concluding remarks 
In these pages, I have proposed an analysis of the precautionary principle as a 
political tool whose invocation can be assessed in court using the lens of 
reasonableness. This argument will allow to (partly) solve the short circuit of the 
application of the precautionary principle which needs science though from science 
only takes the (non-hypothetical) uncertainty. To reduce the role of courts as 
‘scientific expert’, I suggested the test of reasonableness, which does not totally 
exclude science, but avoids the risk for the court to become the ‘decision-makers’ 
of which scientific outcome should prevail. This analysis of the precautionary 
principle seems in line with the inevitable character of uncertainty of the principle. 
As Foster pointed out:  
How much scientific uncertainty would there have to be for the 
precautionary principle to apply? Determining an objective and precise level 
 
128 Ibid.  
129 I am referring to the ‘objective reasonableness’ applied by the International Court of Justice 
in the Whaling in the Antarctic case (para. 67). For a critical approach of the standard used by 
the Court, see S.R. Tully, ‘Objective Reasonableness’ as a Standard for International Judicial 
Review, in Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 6(3), 2015, 546 ss. See also C. Ragni, 
Interpretazione dei trattati e standard of review nella giurisprudenza della Corte internazionale di 
giustizia: riflessioni sull’affare della caccia alla balena nell’Antartico, in Rivista di diritto 
internazionale, 2014, 3, 725 ss.  
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of scientific certainty or uncertainty in relation to any piece of scientific 
knowledge is not possible130. 
She discussed the concepts that have been used to grasp in scientific terms 
the principle, such as ‘reasonable scientific plausibility’ or ‘reasonable concern’ for 
harm. However, none of these can really solve the issue of how courts can delve 
into scientific matters. The solution that is proposed in these pages resembles the 
legal reasoning that was followed by the CJEU in its recent Tapiola case, which 
deserves closer attention not only for what concerns the reasonableness test, which 
was implicitly applied according to my analysis, but also because it shows an 
unprecedented eco-centric move that leaves hope for the future jurisprudence of 
the Court on the conservation and preservation of non-human animals131.  
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